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CASE NOTES
Environmental Law—Water Pollution Remedies—Use of Public
Nuisance Theory in Suit by Federal and State Govern-
ments—United States v. United States Steel Corp.' —The United
States and the State of Illinois sought permanent injunctive relief in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
to prevent the defendant, United States Steel Corporation, from
discharging five and one half million gallons of waste water per day
from its Illinois works into Lake Michigan, a navigable interstate
body of water. 2 Plaintiffs, alleging that this daily discharge of indus-
trial waste had a destructive effect on the aquatic life and water
quality of Lake Michigan, 3 filed a complaint consisting of three
counts, seeking the same relief on three different legal theories.
Count I, filed by both the United States and the State of Illinois,
requested that the court enjoin these discharges under its federal
common law power to abate public nuisances 4 in navigable or
interstate waters. Count II, brought solely by the United States to
restrain these discharges, alleged that such emissions were violative
of section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (the 1899 Act). 5
Count III, filed solely by the State of Illinois, requested the court to
invoke its pendent jurisdiction to abate this public nuisance under
the common law of Illinois.
Defendant, U.S. Steel, moved for dismissal of the complaint. It
argued, as to Count I, that the federal common law power to abate
public nuisances in navigable or interstate waters has been recog-
nized in only two situations: first, where there is a conflict between
sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns and the polluter and the victims of
the pollution reside in different states; and second, where there are
express statutory enactments from which the court implies a remedy
or develops a rule in order to implement the statutes. The defendant
356 F. Supp. 556 (N. D. Ill. 1973).
2 Although not mentioned in the court's opinion, the waste water reportedly contained
iron, zinc, lead, cyanide and grease. See 3 E.R.C. (Current Developments) 683 (1972). The
plaintiffs also sought the installation by the defendants of waste treatment facilities to
eliminate the discharge of contaminants. Id.
3 Brief for State of Illinois as Plaintiff at 1, United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. 111. 1973). Plaintiffs also alleged that the discharges contained
significant color and cloudiness which degraded the aesthetic quality of the lake as well as its
use as a recreational facility. See 3 E.R.C. (Current Developments) 683 (1972).
A public nuisance is lamn act or omission 'which obstructs or causes inconvenience or
damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all " W. Prosser, Handbook of
the Law of Torts 583 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted),
5 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). This section,1 popularly known as the 1899 Refuse Act,
provides in pertinent part:
It shall not be lawful to . . . discharge . .. from .	 . [a] . . . manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever ... into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of
any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such
navigable water . . . .
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contended that in the instant case there was no conflict of
sovereigns, that both the alleged polluter and the alleged victims
resided in the State of Illinois, and that, to the extent that federal
statutes, applied, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)6
 was a comprehensive statute which preempted federal
common law. Alternatively, the defendant argued that the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (1972
Amendments) 7 superseded the federal common law since they
specifically provided for injunctive relief.
In response to Count II, the defendant alternatively contended
that: (1) the 1899 Act was not intended to apply to the discharge of
waste water, but rather to the navigable capacity of the nation's
waterways; 8 (2) the defendant had applied for a permit to allow the
discharge of waste water in accordance with the permit program of
the 1899 Act, and, having been foreclosed by operation of law from
obtaining such a permit, could not then be prosecuted under that
act; 9 (3) the 1899 Act had been superseded by the FWPCA;" (4) the
1972 Amendments prohibit the prosecution under the 1899 Act of
those who have pending permit applications; 11 and (5) the 1899 Act
• 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151 et seq. (1970).
7 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. II 1972).
In support of this claim, defendants relied on Comment, Discharging New Wine Into
Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U. Pitt. L.
Rev, 483 (1972), and the dissent of Justice Harlan in United States v. Republic Steel Corp.,
362 U.S. 482, 493 (1960) (dissenting opinion), both of which argue that an interpretation of the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 as applying only to discharges which impede navigation is
required by the legislative history of the Act. Contra, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co.,
384 U.S. 224 (1966) (interpreting the 1899 Act as applying to all foreign substances and
pollutants); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v.
Maplewood Poultry Co., 327 F. Supp. 686 (D. Me. 1971) (stating that the 1899 Act prohibits
all discharges of polluting matter—other that sewage—into navigable waters).
• Defendant claimed that enforcement
under these circumstances would be contrary to the intention of Congress ... and
would constitute an unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction unrelated to
any legitimate public end, thereby depriving the defendant of Due Process of law in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Brief for Defendant at 10, United States v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D,
Ill. 1973) (citations omitted) thereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant]. Contra, United States
v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (where the Court held that the 1899
Act does not require the establishment of a formal regulatory permit program allowing
otherwise prohibited discharges of refuse into navigable water, and that the unavailability of
such a program does not bar prosecution under that act for an alleged violation).
19
 Brief for Defendant, supra note 9, at 4-5.
11
 The defendant relied on 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. II 1972). This section provides in
pertinent part:
Until December 31, 1974, in any case where a permit for discharge has been applied
for pursuant to this section, but final administrative disposition of such application
has not been made, such discharge shall not be a violation of ... section 407 of this
title
An earlier decision, United States v. Consolidation Coal Co., 354 F. Supp. 173, 179 (N.D.W.
Va. 1973), held, inter alia, that § 1342(k) was intended to be applied prospectively and was
not intended to apply to pending litigation.
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does not expressly provide for civil remedies, since it is a criminal
statute. 12
In denying the defendant's motion to dismiss Count I, the
district court HELD: that both the United States and the State of
Illinois had a cause of action and standing to sue under the federal
common law of nuisance to abate the pollution of a navigable
interstate body of water;" that the federal district court, under 28
U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), had jurisdiction over an action founded on
federal common law;" and that neither the FWPCA nor the 1972
Amendments preempted the federal common law as it applied to
this action." As to Count II, the court found that the United States
had a cause of action under the 1899 Act to enjoin the pollution of a
navigable interstate body of water, and that this cause of action was
unimpeded by the FWPCA or the 1972 Amendments." The court
dismissed Count III, stating that "[i]t adds nothing to the other two
[counts] ... [for] . . . if plaintiffs succeed on the earlier counts, .
[the third count] is merely cumulative." 17
The tripartite significance of U.S. Steel lies in its extension of
the recent Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 18 in which the Court declared that a plaintiff state had
a valid cause of action under federal common law to enjoin the
pollution of interstate waters by governmental bodies in other states.
U.S. Steel first stressed that such action may be brought to enjoin
the pollution of interstate waters by non-governmental parties, even
where the polluting activities and the party alleging injury are
totally within the jurisdiction of one state. Secondly, the court
extended that cause of action to include, under the federal common
law, actions to enjoin the pollution of interstate waters brought by
the federal government as well as by an aggrieved state. Finally, the
decision established the viability of such action despite the existence
of the FWPCA and the 1972 Amendments.
12 However, general injunctive relief has been implied from the 1899 Act by the courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491-93 (1960).
Defendant reserved argument on Count III, noting that the court's jurisdiction of the
pendent claim was dependent upon the validity of Count 1, which the defendant contended
should be dismissed,
15 356 F. Supp. at 558.
14 Id. The jurisdictional section to which the court referred provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
13 356 F. Supp. at 558.
lb Id. at 559-60. This note is limited to a discussion of the federal common law and
related issues of Count I. The court's decision in Count II under § 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 407 (1970), will not be discussed in any depth greater than
already presented in notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
17 356 F. Supp. at 560.
le 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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This note will consider and evaluate the U.S. Steel court's
extension of the federal common law cause of action enunciated by
the Supreme Court in City of Milwaukee. In particular, this note
will first explain the City of Milwaukee decision, noting those areas
left ambiguous by that decision. The defendant's contentions that
City of Milwaukee should not be extended to the facts of U.S. Steel
will then be analyzed, beginning first with an examination of the
claim that the federal common law is applicable only to conflicts
between sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns, and proceeding to an
analysis of the contention that the federal common law is applicable
only in situations where the polluter is located outside the jurisdic-
tion of the injured state. The standing of both the state and the
United States to bring actions based on the federal common law of
nuisance will then be considered, leading finally to a consideration
of the effect which the FWPCA and its 1972 Amendments have on
the continued vitality of the federal common law in this area. It will
be submitted that the court in U.S. Steel correctly concluded that
the legal character and physical location of the polluter are immater 7
ial to an action under the federal common law of nuisance for the
abatement of pollution in interstate waters, and that neither the
FWPCA nor its 1972 Amendments preempt the federal common law
of public nuisance in an action brought by a state. However, it also
will be submitted that, in light of the federal policy expressed in the
FWPCA of deferral to the states for primary pollution abatement
action, and the action taken by the State of Illinois to enjoin the
alleged discharges by the defendant, and in light of the specific
procedures in the FWPCA for pollution abatement action by the
federal government, the United States should not have been permit-
ted to bring this particular action under the federal common law.
The Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
was a milestone in the legislative and judicial history of federal
jurisdiction over public nuisance actions. The institution of public
nuisance actions by the United States to protect navigable or inter-
state waters virtually ceased after the enactment of the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899) 9 Although this Act expressly provided penal
sanctions for all violators 20 and offered only limited injunctive
relief, 21
 the courts consistently implied a provision for general in-
junctive relief into the Act, 22
 finding such provision indispensable
for fulfillment of the policy mandate of the legislation. 23
19
 Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, 767, 775 (1973). For a discussion of the historical
use of the public nuisance concept in the protection of public rights in interstate and navigable
waters, see id. at 774-79.
20 33 U.S.C. §§ 406, 411 (1970).
21 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970) (providing that the removal of structures or parts of structures
erected in violation of §§ 401, 403 and 404 of the 1899 Act may be enforced by injunction).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491-93 (1960); Sanitary
District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925).
23
 The Supreme Court has read the prohibition of § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970), as proscribing the introduction of any and all foreign substances
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The states, however, cannot enforce the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899. 24 Therefore, public nuisance actions, under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 25 continued to be used by states
seeking injunctive relief from polluting activities of other states and
their subdivisions. 26
 This practice was confronted with a formidable
obstacle when, in the case of Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 27
the Supreme Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction in an
action brought by the State of Ohio, alleging that the pollution of
Lake Erie tributaries by Wyandotte, a non-resident corporation,
was a public nuisance. In remitting the parties to a state court, the
Court implied that there was no alternative federal forum available
to an aggrieved state for the abatement of pollution in an interstate
body of water. 28 Thus, Ohio was deprived of a federal forum in an
and pollutants into the navigable waters of the United States, See note 8 supra. Noting that,
in some cases, the polluting party may find it economically more advantageous to pay the fine
imposed while allowing discharges to continue, and further noting the unsuitability of impos-
ing prison sentences for violations of the Act, the Court has held that injunctive relief is a
proper enforcement measure, necessary to ensure "the full effectiveness of the Act." Wyan-
dotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967).
24 See 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1970),
25 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, provides in pertinent part: "In all Cases , .. in which a State
shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." The original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is explained more clearly in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970), which provides
in pertinent part: "(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction
of: . . . (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against citizens of another State or against
aliens."
26 See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (garbage dumped at
sea carried to state's beaches by tide); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921)
(threatened discharge of sewage into New York harbor); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S 230 (1907) (discharge of noxious gases' from defendant's works carried over large
tracts of plaintiff's territory); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (dumping of sewage in
an interstate stream). It should be noted, however, that historically most cases involving
interstate public nuisances have been settled through mutual agreement.
27 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
28
 Id. at 498-99 n,3. The Court concluded that the district court would not have
jurisdiction over this action, stating:
This particular case cannot be disposed of by transferring it to an appropriate federal
district court since [28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)] by itself does not actually confer jurisdic-
tion on those courts .. , and no other statutory jurisdictional basis exists, The fact
that there is diversity of citizenship among the parties would not support district
court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because that statute does not deal with
cases in which a State is a party. Nor would federal question jurisdiction exist under
28 U.S.C. § 1331. So far as it appears from the present record, an action such as
this, if otherwise cognizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated
under state law.
Id. (citations omitted). But see the dissent of Justice Douglas, stating that, as navigable waters
are under the sovereignty of the federal government, this case raises issues of federal law and
presents "a classic type of case congenial to our original jurisdiction." Id. at 505 (dissenting
opinion). This would appear to be inconsistent with Justice Douglas' authorship of the City of
Milwaukee opinion, in which the Court remitted the parties to a federal district court. 406
U.S. at 108. Justice Douglas may have felt that while a state court would not be an
appropriate forum, such a case would be cognizable before either the Supreme Court or a
federal district court. However, Justice Douglas, in his dissent to Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 505,
did not suggest the federal district court as an alternative forum to the Supreme Court.
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action against a rin-resident polluter and was limited to the unsatis-
factory choice of proceeding in either its own state court or the state
court of the non-resident polluter. 29
In City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court established a federal
forum in the federal district courts for actions brought by states,
against non-resident governmental polluters, alleging public nuis-
ance violations in navigable or interstate waters. In that case the
State of Illinois, attempting to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, moved for leave to file a complaint against four
cities and two local sewerage commissions of the State of
Wisconsin. 3° Illinois sought injunctive relief, alleging that the de-
fendants were unlawfully polluting Lake Michigan. The Supreme
Court, declining to exercise its original jurisdiction, denied the mo-
tion and remitted the parties to an appropriate federal district court,
stating that the powers of the district court "are adequate to resolve
the issues. "31
In so doing, the Supreme Court held that aggrieved states, at
least in the absence of statutory remedies which expressly preempt
common law, have a cause of action for abatement of pollution of
interstate waters by subdivisions of other states under the federal
common law of nuisance. 32 Because City of Milwaukee factually
involved an interstate intersovereign conflict, there remained some
ambiguity as to how far the Supreme Court had opened the doors of
the federal courthouse to actions founded on the federal common
law of public nuisance. Specifically, questions remained as to
whether the federal common law of public nuisance was applicable
in cases not involving conflicts between sovereigns or quasi-
sovereigns, in situations where the polluter was located within the
jurisdiction of the state bringing the action, or in actions brought at
the behest of the federal government. Further, since City of Mil-
29
 If relief is sought in the courts of the aggrieved state there are problems with service of
process, jurisdiction, and enforcement of judgments. It is unlikely that the courts in the
defendant's state would be willing to enforce the plaintiff state's injunction. For that reason,
as well as by reason of the fear of unduly interfering with the affairs of the other state, it is
likely that the courts of the plaintiff state would refuse to grant injunctive relief. See generally
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 102, 103 (1971). If relief is sought in the state
where the defendants reside, problems of an unfavorable forum or unfavorable laws may
arise. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The object of vesting in the courts of the United States jurisdiction of suits by one
state against citizens of another was to . . . avoid the partiality, or suspicion of
partiality, which might exist if the plaintiff state were compelled to resort to the
courts of the state of which the defendants were citizens.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888) (citations omitted). See also Note, 50
Texas L. Rev. 183, 184 (1971). Similarly, if the defendant is a resident of the plaintiff state,
that state's court may favor the economic interest of the state over environmental interests in
interstate waters. See text at note 52 infra.
30 406 U.S. at 100-01.
31 Id. at 108.
33
 Id. at 99-100, 103. See generally Note, 77 Dick. L. Rev. 451 (1973); Comment, 7
Suffolk L. Rev. 790 (1973); Note, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 301 (1973).
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waukee pre-dated the 1972 Amendments, the effect of those
amendments on the continued vitality of the federal common law of
public nuisance remained uncertain.
U.S. Steel, in the instant case, first argued that the court should
limit the decision in City of Milwaukee to the facts of that case and
apply federal common law solely to actions involving a conflict
between sovereigns or quasi-sovereigns." While it is true that City
of Milwaukee involved an action by a state against a subdivision of
another state, undue emphasis on this fact could be misleading. In
light of the problem caused by Wyandotte, the broad terms in which
the City of Milwaukee opinion is couched, and the opinion of the
Court in Washington v. General Motors Corp., 34 decided the same
day as City of Milwaukee, it is submitted that the decision in City of
Milwaukee is best read as creating a cause of action under federal
common law based not on the sovereign or quasi-sovereign charac-
ter of the polluter, but rather on the character of the resource being
protected.
Support is lent to this interpretation by the fact that the Court
in City of Milwaukee quoted with approval the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Texas v., Pankey," which upheld the right of a state to
invoke federal common law nuisance against private polluters in
another state 36 to abate the pollution of a navigable or interstate
stream. 37 Further, in a footnote to its opinion, the Court in City of
Milwaukee commented that "Lilt is not only the character of the
parties that requires us to apply federal law." 38
 This footnote refers
to a statement in the text of the opinion that "Nights in interstate
streams . . . 'have been recognized as presenting federal
questions.' "39 A reasonable reading of this footnote leads to the
33 Brief for Defendant, supra note 9, at 2-3. It should he noted that the limitation on the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts to actions involving "conflicts between sovereigns or
quasi-sovereigns" suggested by the defendant would in reality limit the district courts to
conflicts between sovereigns and quasi-sovereigns and to conflicts between two quasi-
sovereigns. This would be the case because conflicts between two states must be heard by the
Supreme Court, despite City of Milwaukee, since the Court is given both original and
exclusive jurisdiction of conflicts between states under 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1970), which
provides in pertinent part; "(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion of : (I) All controversies between two or more States . . . ."
34 406 U.S. 109 (1972). Significantly, both City of Milwaukee and Washington were
decided by unanimous Courts.
33 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971),
36
 The Pankey case was brought by Texas in federal district court to enjoin residents of
New Mexico from using pesticides which, Texas claimed, were being carried into an interstate
river used as a source of water by several Texas municipalities. Id. at 237-38. The Tenth
Circuit, reversing the district court's dismissal of the action, held that jurisdiction of the action
was granted to the federal district court by 28 U.S.C. * 1331(a) (1970). 441 F.2d at 242.
37 406 U.S. at 103, 107 n.9.
3 ° Id. at 105 n.6. (emphasis added).
39 Id. at 105, quoting Hinderliter v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). "The
underlying purpose of the federal system is to provide each state with authority to govern
events occurring within its domain while reserving to the federal government the power to
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conclusion that there are factors other than the governmental
character of the parties—namely the overriding federal interest in
interstate waters and the need for uniform decisions to protect these
waters"—which compel the application of federal common law to
disputes involving navigable or interstate waters.'"
The decision of the Court in Washington would appear to be in
accord with just such a reading of this footnote. In Washington the
plaintiff states sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in an action against the nation's four major au-
tomobile manufacturers seeking injunctive relief for, inter alia, pub-
lic nuisance contrary to state and federal policy. The Supreme
Court, in declining to exercise its original jurisdiction, remitted the
parties to an appropriate federal district court. The plaintiffs, the
Court noted, were free to bring against the defendants (all of which
were private corporations) any appropriate action, including one
predicated upon the nuisance theory pressed in City of Milwaukee. 42
Further support for the assertion that an action founded on the
federal common law of nuisance is not dependent upon the
sovereign or quasi-sovereign character of the polluter can be found
in the jurisdictional basis supporting such actions. The Court in City
of Milwaukee held that federal district courts are the proper forums
for federal common law actions under general "federal question"
jurisdiction,'" construing the federal common law as a "law" of the
United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)." In
so construing section 1331(a), the Court in City of Milwaukee
adopted the view expressed by Justice Brennan in Romero v. Inter-
national Terminal Operating Co. 45 that
[t]he contention cannot be accepted that since
petitioner's rights are judicially defined, they are not
created by "the laws .. . of the United States" within the
meaning of § 1331 . . . In another context, that of state
control occurrences that eject more than one state." Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183 (1971)
(emphasis added).
40 406 U.S. at 105 n.6.
41
 One writer, however, presents two alternative readings:
[The Court's footnote in question] could be construed as meaning that it was
indeed the governmental character of the parties which compelled the application of
federal common law, although there were additional non-compelling reasons for
doing so. Alternatively, this statement could mean that there were other considera-
tions which themselves required the application of federal law, and that the charac-
ter of the parties merely added force to the persuasiveness of these other considera-
tions.
Note, 52 Neb. L. Rev. 301, 305 (1973).
42 406 U.S. at 112 n.2.
43
 General "federal question" subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on federal district
courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). See note 14 supra.
" 406 U.S. at 99-100.
45 358 U.S. 354 (1959). The majority opinion in Romero did not reach the question of
whether federal common laws are "laws" within the meaning of § 1331(a).
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law, this Court has recognized that the statutory word
"laws" includes court decisions. The converse situation is
presented here in that federal courts have an extensive
responsibility of fashioning rules of substantive law . . . .
These rules are as fully "laws" of the United States as if
they had been enacted by the Congress. 46
The pollution of a navigable or interstate water, therefore, is a
public nuisance under the federal common law and presents a "fed-
eral question" over which federal courts have jurisdiction, regardless
of the legal character of the parties.
It seems clear from the unequivocal language of the Court in
City of Milwaukee, the decision of the Court in Washington, and the
jurisdictional basis supporting actions founded on the federal com-
mon law of nuisance, that private parties which pollute navigable or
interstate waters are subject to actions in federal district courts
under the federal common law of nuisance. The basis for the appli-
cation of federal common law lies in the character of the resource
being protected, i.e., a navigable or interstate water, and not in the
sovereign or quasi-sovereign character of the polluter. The
U.S.Steel court agreed with the interpretation of the decision in City
of Milwaukee as establishing a cause of action under the federal
common law when an interstate body of water is polluted, regard-
less of the legal character of the polluter.
The second contention of the defendant in U.S. Steel was that
City of Milwaukee should be limited to the holding that federal
common law is applicable only in situations where the polluter is
discharging in one state and the victims of the pollution reside in
another state. However, the Court in City of Milwaukee nowhere
expressed an intention that its decision should be so narrowly con-
strued; to the contrary, there is much evidence that no such intent in
fact existed.
After discussing the numerous federal statutes regulating pollu-
tion in interstate waters, 47 the Court noted that while it is federal
policy to defer to the states in preventing and controlling water
pollution, it is "clear that it is federal, not state, law that in the end
controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters."48 Recogniz-
ing that state law was inapplicable, and pointing out that no federal
statutes provided the precise remedy sought by Illinois," the Court
stated that the remedies provided by Congress were not the only
46 406 U.S. at 99, citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 393 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The question of the jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331(a) was easily resolved by
the City of Milwaukee Court, which noted that Title considerable interests involved in the
purity of interstate waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional amount . . ."
406 U.S, at 98. This statement applies with equal force to the situation in U.S. Steel.
47 406 U.S. at 101-02.
48
 Id, at 102 (footnote omitted).
, 49 Id, at 103.
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remedies available, that federal courts could fashion federal law
where federal rights are concerned, and that "when we deal with
. . . water in its . . . interstate aspects, there is a federal common
law."5° Further, the Court suggested that the interest of the federal
government in protecting the navigable interstate waters of the
United States demands a uniformity of decisions which can only be
achieved through the application of federal law. 5 ' The need for
uniformity is a direct and logical concomitant not of the location of
the polluter, but of the character of the resource.
Persuasive arguments can be made in support of the contention
that interstate waters, because their boundaries are not coterminous
with the borders of the states, are not well suited to state control.
Problems involving interstate bodies of water must be dealt with
from a broader perspective than that of the individual states. Should
the varying laws of the states be seen to govern disputes involving
interstate waters, those states with stricter water quality standards
could be adversely affected by pollution emanating from states with
more lenient standards. Further, it is submitted that a backlash -
reaction, with its obvious adverse effect upon the natural resource in
question, could result from resigning anti-pollution responsibilities
entirely to the states. For example, if a state enacted strict anti-
pollution regulations, it might correspondingly engender economic
retaliation. Local industry, unwilling to submit to such restrictions,
might find it well worth the effort to relocate in a state with less
demanding laws. Any such move—or even the threat thereof—on
the part of job- and revenue-generating businesses would run a high
risk of inducing the state to modify its regulations (or, if still in the
planning stage, to shelve proposals for anti-pollution requirements).
It does not seem overly cynical to assume that state judicial deci-
sions might be equally likely to be affected by overwhelming state
interest in retaining and attracting industry. Federal courts, how-
ever, by applying to all disputes involving interstate waters the same
body of law, rather than the varying law of the states (as well as by
viewing all possible interests involved from a broader, more objec-
tive perspective), are better able to protect the nation's interstate
waters.$ 2
The court in U.S. Steel was not the first to view the City of
Milwaukee holding as extrapolatable beyond the City of Milwaukee
5° Id. See also id. at 103 n.5.
51 In a footnote to its opinion, the Court stated: "Where there is an overriding federal
interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the controversy touches basic
interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal common law." Id. at 105 n.6. Unifor-
mity is established by bringing actions under federal common law in federal district courts in
that all actions, while largely dependent upon the informed judgments of the federal judges,
are resolved according to the same body of law rather than the varying laws of the states.
Note, 77 Dick. L. Rev. 455, 455-56 (1973).
52 See Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 Wayne
L. Rev, 317, 331-32 (1967).
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facts. In United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc.," the District
Court for the District of Vermont extended City of Milwaukee to
allow the United States to bring an action under the federal common
law of nuisance against a private corporation located in Vermont.
The decision in Bushey is significant not only because of its implicit
agreement that the federal common law of nuisance could support
an action against a private corporation, but also because it applied
that same federal common law to intrastate pollution of a navigable,
interstate body of water. In Bushey the polluter was located in
Vermont, the suit was brought in the federal district court for
Vermont, and the polluting substances were spilled into the Ver-
mont waters of Lake Champlain." Lake Champlain is both a
navigable and an interstate body of water, as is Lake Michigan in
the instant case. The court in Bushey denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mil-
waukee which, it observed, enunciated a federal common law right
to seek abatement of pollution in a navigable or interstate body of
water. 55 It is a reasonable inference from the Bushey court's silence
on the issue of the location of the defendant that this factor is
immaterial in light of the fact that the resource being damaged was
a navigable and interstate water and, as such, was within the
purview of the federal common law.
This inference is further supported by the fact that actions
founded upon the federal common law of nuisance have been recog-
nized as presenting federal questions, no more dependent upon
diversity of citizenship56
 than upon the sovereign nature of the
parties. 57
 While the defendant's discharge may not have actually
caused pollution across state lines, it is the interstate character of
Lake Michigan, and not the location of the source of the polluting
discharge, which confers jurisdiction upon the U.S. Steel court
under the federal common law of nuisance. 58
The decision in U.S. Steel also raised the issue of the standing
of both the State of Illinois and the United States to bring an action
founded on federal common law. The standing of a state to enforce
federal common law on behalf of its residents in seeking abatement
of an interstate public nuisance was recognized by the Court in City
of Milwaukee 59
 as having been settled in Georgia v. Tennessee
53 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972). See Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev, 767 (1973).
54 346 F. Supp. at 146.
55
 Id. at 149-50.
56
 A suit between a state and citizens of another state will not qualify as an action based
on diversity of citizenship because a state cannot be a citizen of itself. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v.
Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 414 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
57 See text at notes 43-44 supra.
58
 Brief for State of Illinois as Plaintiff at 5.6, United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
59 406 U.S. at 104.
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Copper Co. 6° In Tennessee Copper, Georgia, invoking the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, complained of damage to its
"forests, orchards, and crops" caused by the non-resident company's
emission of sulphurous acid gas, and requested that the Court enjoin
defendant's emissions. 61 The Court, agreeing with Georgia, recog-
nized the right of a state to make such a demand on behalf of its
residents. 62 In U.S. Steel the State of Illinois presented an equally
reasonable demand, namely, that the court enjoin the defendant
corporation from continuing its discharges in order "to preserve the
purity and recreational value of Lake Michigan in which the State
and its residents have an obvious interest." 63
Turning to the standing of the United States to bring this
action, the court in U.S. Steel, while noting that the Supreme Court
"has never explicitly held that the government of the United States
has standing to abate a common law nuisance on behalf of its
residents,"64 held that the right of the federal government to inter-
vene in this litigation coupled with its "proprietary interest in the
navigable waters of Lake Michigan . . [and its] . . interest in
establishing a 'uniform rule of decision' by enforcing a Federal
common law" was sufficient to confer upon the United States stand-
ing to sue in this instance. 65 Similarly, the standing of the United
States to enforce the federal common law of public nuisance was
acknowledged by another federal district court in the Bushey case,
where it was said that the Attorney General may sue to protect
federal interests in the quality of air and water in their ambient or
interstate aspects. 66
The final issue raised by the decision in U.S. Steel is whether
the federal common law of public nuisance, when used at the behest
of the states or the federal government, is compatible with the
FWPCA or the 1972 Amendments.
With regard to the effect of the FWPCA on the continued
vitality of the federal common law of public nuisance when used by
states or subdivisions of states, the Supreme Court decision in City
of Milwaukee is controlling. In that case, the Supreme Court
specifically noted that while "[t]he remedy sought by Illinois is not
within the precise scope of the remedies prescribed by Congress," 67
federal courts are not restricted solely to those remedies provided by
Congress, having the power to " 'fashion federal law where federal
rights are concerned.' "68 The Court proceeded to enunciate a fed-
60 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
6 ' Id. at 236.
62 Id. at 238.
63 356  F. Supp. at 558.
64 Id.
63 Id.
66 346 F. Supp. at 149-50.
67 406 U.S. at 103.
68 Id., quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
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eral common law of public nuisance to abate pollution in navigable
or interstate waters stating that "[t]he application of federal common
law . . . is not inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act," 69
Since there are no provisions in the FWPCA which regulate state
pollution abatement actions, the use of the federal common law of
public nuisance in suits maintained by state governments is not
inconsistent with the FWPCA. It must be concluded, therefore,
that, at least prior to the 1972 Amendments, the FWPCA did not
preempt plaintiff Illinois' use of the federal common law of public
nuisance in the U.S. Steel case.
As regards the use of the federal common law at the behest of
the federal government, however, the issue is more complex. While
it is clear that the federal government has sufficient interest in the
navigable and interstate waters of the United States to satisfy the
requirements for standing to bring a pollution abatement action, it is
not at all clear that the federal common law of public nuisance
provides an appropriate basis for federal action.
Congress, in the FWPCA, stated that the general policy of the
federal government was to rely primarily on the states for anti-
pollution enforcement, and to supplement state action with federal
action only where necessary. 7 ° It can reasonably be submitted that
the drafters of the FWPCA considered the possibility of federal
enforcement undesirable except in cases where the state did not
act." Moreover, in order to ensure that the states would bear the
primary responsibility for pollution abatement, Congress included in
the FWPCA specific provisions regulating federal abatement
actions. 72 These provisions include conference and hearing proce-
dures coupled with attempts by the federal government to induce
state action prior to the authorization of federal action."
Nevertheless, in Bushey, the Vermont district court, dealing
with a comparable provision of the FWPCA which regulated dis-
charges of oil into navigable or interstate waters, 74 held that federal
action under the federal common law of public nuisance was consis-
tent with the FWPCA. The court stated:
What is important about Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
for the purposes of the instant case, however, is the decla-
ration there that the numerous laws Congress has enacted
to prohibit or control pollution of interstate waters or
69 406 U.S. at 104.
7 ° See 33 U.S.C. *§ 1151(b), 1160(b) (1970).
71 See 33 U.S.C.	 1160(b) (1970), which provides:
Consistent with the policy declaration of this chapter, State and interstate action
to abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not,
except as otherwise provided by or pursuant to court order under subsection (h) of
this section, be displaced by Federal enforcement action.
72 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970).
73 33 U.S.C. ** 1160(d)-(g) (1970).
34 33 U.S.C. § 1161(e) (1970).
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navigable waters do not establish in themselves the exclu-
sive means by which the federal policy concerning, and
interest in, the quality of waters under federal jurisdiction
may be protected in the federal courts. 75
While this statement is concededly accurate when applied to pollu-
tion abatement actions brought by states or their subdivisions, it is
submitted that the extension of public nuisance to include actions
brought at the behest of the federal government would permit the
federal government to circumvent the specific procedures established
by Congress for federal abatement action and would be inconsistent
with the policy embodied in the FWPCA of deferral to the states for
primary pollution enforcement.
Where the state does not act to enjoin the pollution of a naviga-
ble or interstate body of water, federal action should be initiated
under the FWPCA according to the procedures established by Con-
gress. Where the state is acting but the federal government is
dissatisfied with the state action and claims that its (the federal
government's) interests are not being adequately represented, the
federal government could arguably intervene as a matter of right
under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 76 How-
ever, in light of the action taken by the State of Illinois in U.S. Steel
and in the absence of any claim by the United States that its
interests would not be adequately represented by the State of Il-
linois, the allowance of federal action in this particular case seems
incompatible with the federal policy expressed in the FWPCA. It is
submitted that the court in U.S. Steel, in accordance with this
policy, should have allowed action under the federal common law to
be brought solely by the State of Illinois. 77
75 346 F. Supp. at 149. But see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 767, 784 (1973)
(arguing that the application of the federal common law in Bushey was inappropriate as
specific relief for the federal government against pollution by oil was provided by § 1161(e) of
the FWPCA).
76 Fed. R. Civ. --P. 24(a)(2) states:
(a) . . Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposi-
tion of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 413-15 (1972).
77
 Albeit not within the precise scope of this note, it should be mentioned that one
commentator has taken the position that:
Having created a federal common law for adjudicating public entities' claims of
injury caused by discharges into ambient or interstate waters, there would appear to
be no ground upon which the Court could bar any person possessing such a claim
from insisting that it be heard by a federal court as a civil action arising under the
laws of the United States.
McMahon, The New Federal Common Law, 13 For the Defense 83, 84 (1972) (footnote
omitted).
While it may be accurate to conclude that the federal common law in this area is not
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The defendant in U.S. Steel further argued that even if the
federal common law was not preempted prior to 1972; such preemp-
tion was nevertheless effected by the 1972 Amendments. 78 The court
in U.S. Steel noted, however, that this action was filed twelve days
prior to the effective date of the 1972 Amendments. 79 Thus, the
1972 Amendments are not here controlling. Despite defendant's
contention that, as prospective relief is being sought, is is impossible
to decide this action without consideration of the 1972
Amendments, 8° it is well settled that pending actions may be prose-
cuted to completion under previously existing laws even where the
relief granted will be prospective. 81
The defendant's agrument is even further weakened by the fact
that the court took the 1972 Amendments into consideration on its
own accord, and nevertheless concluded that "bv]e no not find any
provision in this amendment which purports to abolish the Federal
limited to the claims of public entities, private actions under the federal common law would
be confronted with several formidable obstacles. First, in order to obtain standing to bring
such an action, the individual would ha've to show that it had suffered "injury in fact." Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). Second, in order to obtain federal jurisdiction,
the individual would have to suffer damage sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). It should be noted that the use of a class action,
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, will not alleviate this problem since the
Supreme Court has recently held that each member of a class must meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 4087 (U.S. Dec. 17,
1973). While the Zahn case was based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1970), the Court, in a footnote to its opinion, noted that the same rule would apply to class
actions invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), specifically
referring to City of Milwaukee. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4091 n.11. It is possible that private class
actions could be brought in federal courts, despite Zahn, in cases where at the time of suit the
defendant has not yet curtailed the alleged pollution, if the plaintiffs
[include] in their complaint a claim for injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2). In
injunction actions the matter in controversy is determined by the value of the right to
be protected or the extent of the injury to be prevented. . . . Having succeeded in
asserting federal jurisdiction over their (b}(2) claim for injunctive relief, [the
plaintiffs] could then [join] their (b)(3) claim for compensatory and punitive damages,
and [invoke] the court's ancillary jurisdiction over this claim.
Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 543, 557-58 n,88 (1973) (citations omitted). Third, in
order to state a claim under a public nuisance theory, the individual would have to suffer
special harm, that is, peculiar harm differing from that suffered by the public generally.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 203(2) and comment d (1965). Finally, the individual would
be required to prove that the damage alleged was in fact caused by the emissions of the
defendant. This problem is not encountered by a sovereign who sues a polluter since the mere
emission of a pollutant into a waterway is injury to the state under the view that the sovereign
has a property interest in the waterway. See Comment, The Scope of State and Local
Government Action in Environmental Land Use Regulation, 13 B.C. Ind, & Corn. L. Rev.
782, 791 (1972).
76 Brief for Defendant at 5-7, United States v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp,
556 (N.D. Ill. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Defendant].
79 356 F. Supp. at 559.
" Brief for Defendant, supra note 78, at 6.
gl State ex rel. City of Grand Island v. Union Pac. R.R., 152 Neb. 772, 778, 788-90, 42
N.W,2d 867, 872, 877-78 (1950). This is especially true where there is a "saving clause," id. at
789-90, 42 N. W.2d at 877-78, as there is in the 1972 Amendments. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (Supp.
II 1972).
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common law of nuisance but rather an intention to supplement and
amplify any preexisting remedies."82
With regard to actions brought by states the decision in
U.S. Steel would seem to be correct. In the first section of the
1972 Amendments it is stated that "[i]t is the policy of the Con-
gress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and right of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution
"83 In addition, another section of the 1972  Amendments states:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing
in this chapter shall ... (2) be construed as impairing or in
any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States
with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of
such States."
There is no language in the Amendments to the FWPCA that
expressly or impliedly preempts the federal common law of public
nuisance as enunciated in City of Milwaukee, nor is there any
language which establishes the Amendments as the exclusive means
to protect federal interests in the quality of interstate or navigable
waters. 85
 Congress has been very explicit where it has intended to
make the statutory structure of the Amendments the exclusive reme-
dial scheme; 86
 absent any such clear intent, nonstatutory remedies,
such as the federal common law of nuisance, must be presumed to
retain their vitality. 87
 As the court in U.S. Steel noted, "kit is
hornbook law that statutes will not be construed in derogation of
common law unless such intent is clear." 88
82
 356 F. Supp. at 559 (citations omitted).
83
 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. II 1972).
84
 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. II 1972).
85
 Rather, § 505(e) of the 1972 Amendments, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Supp. II 1972),
specifically allows suits by citizens under common law, stating that:
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of
persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the
Administrator or a State' agency).
8' See 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970), left unchanged by the 1972 Amendments, 33 U.S.C. §
1321 (Supp. II 1972); 33 U.S.C. § 1163(f) (1970), left unchanged by the 1972 Amendments, 33
U.S.C. § 1322(f)(1) (Supp. II 1972) (expressly prohibiting action outside the FWPCA with
respect to regulation of marine sanitation devices).
87
 The Supreme Court, in construing the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq.
(1970), indicated that statutes are preempted only where Congress has explicitly so stated and
that nonstatutory,
 remedies such as the federal common law continue to exist in the absence of
express preemption. See Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1972).
IS
 356 F. Supp. at 559, citing Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 778, 783 (1952),
As this note reached completion, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois denied defendant's motion to dismiss in the case of Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 5 E.R.C. 2018 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (remitted by the Supreme Court, 406 U.S. at 108).
The court, in almost complete agreement with the reasoning proposed in notes 8247 supra
and accompanying text, held that the 1972 Amendments do not preempt federal common law
nuisance actions in interstate waters. 5 E.R.C. at 2020. Further, the court held that two
recent regulations-40 C.F. R. §§ 125, 130 (1973)—promulgated by the Environmental Protec-
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The unlikelihood that federal common law of nuisance actions
by states or their subdivisions were foreclosed by the specific re-
medies of the 1972 Amendments is further established through an
examination of the provisions of the Clean Air Act. 89
 In existence
for some time prior to the decision in City of Milwaukee, 90 the Clean
Air Act provides for specific remedies similar to those in the 1972
Amendments. 9 I Yet, in Washington v. General Motors Corp., 92 an
air pollution case decided the same day as City of Milwaukee, the
. Supreme Court, in remitting the parties to a federal district court, 93
noted specifically that the plaintiffs might renew their public nuis-
ance count according to the rationale of City of Milwaukee. 94 As the
Clean Air Act was in effect at the time of the Court's decision in
Washington, this suggestion by the Court indicates the Court's belief
that federal common law actions as enunciated in City of Milwaukee
are not preempted by the existence of statutory remedies such as
those found in the Clean Air Act. Since the remedial provisions of
the 1972 Amendments are similar to those found in the Clean Air
Act, it would seem that the use of the federal common law in actions
by states would also avoid preemption by the 1972 Amendments.
As regards the use of the federal common law at the behest of
the federal government, it is submitted that the allowance of such
action would be inconsistent with the 1972 Amendments. While the
1972 Amendments change the federal government's authority to
bring abatement suits, permitting them whenever the government
becomes aware of any violations of the Act, 95
 the policy of deferral
to the states for primary pollution enforcement has been continued
tion Agency in accord with the design of the 1972 Amendments do not preempt federal
common law nuisance actions, despite defendant's contention that these regulations "now set
up a uniform federal law which preempts federal common law . . ." 5 E.R.C. at 2020.
This conclusion is further supported by the decision of the District Court for the District
of Vermont in United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 5 E.R.C. 1710 (D. Vt. 1973), in
which the court ordered a permanent injunction against Bushey and the other defendants
requiring their compliance with specific measures designed to control their oil spills. In so
ordering, the court in Bushey held that federal common law nuisance actions were not
preempted by the 1972 Amendments. Id, at 1716-17. Since the Bushey case was instituted
prior to the 1972 Amendments, however, it would seem that the 1972 Amendments would not
be controlling in that case. See text at notes 78-81 supra.
88
 42 U.S.C. *5 1857 et seq. (1970). See generally Comment, The Aftermath of the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970: The Federal Courts and Air Pollution, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 724 {1973).
9° The Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), was enacted on Dec. 31,
1970. It is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
91
 Compare § 113(b) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970), with 309(b) of
the 1972 FWPCA Amendments, 33 U.S,C.
	 1319(b) (Supp. II 1972).
82
 406 U.S. 109 (1972). See text at note 42 supra.
83
 Id. at 116.
" Id. at 112 n.2.
85
 Section 301(a) of the 1972 Amendments, 33 U.S.C. §5 1311(a) (Supp. II 1972), states
that "Mlle discharge of any pollutant by any person [not in compliance with this Act)shall be
unlawful . . . ," and 55 309(aX1), (3), and (b), 33 U.S.C. §5 1319(01), (3), (b) (Supp. lI 1972),
taken together, authorize commencement of civil action, including injunction, against any
violators of § 301(a).
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in the 1972 Amendments. 96 Additionally, the Public Works Com-
mittee stated in the legislative history to the 1972 Amendments that:
The Committee does not intend this jurisdiction of the
Federal government to supplant state enforcement. Rather
the Committee intends that the enforcement power of the
Federal government be available in cases where States and
other appropriate enforcement agencies are not acting ex-
peditiously and vigorously to enforce control requirements.
The Committee again ... notes that the authority of
the Federal government should be used judiciously by the
Administrator in those cases [which] deserve Federal action,
because of their national character, scope, or seriousness.
The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement
actions be brought by the State. It is clear that the Ad-
ministrator is not to establish an . enforcement bureaucracy
but rather to reserve his authority for the cases of
paramount interest. 97
It is submitted, therefore, that federal abatement action should be
used sparingly by the federal government, and that when the federal
government does act it should proceed under the provisions of the
1972 Amendments.
In conclusion, the overriding federal interest in protecting inter-
state waters, combined with the need for uniform decisions in this
area, and the greater ability of the federal courts to solve problems
in areas which ultimately affect more than one state, necessitate the
availability of a federal forum for all actions involving the pollution
of interstate bodies of water. The court in U.S. Steel correctly
extended the federal common law of public nuisance to include an
action by an aggrieved state for the abatement of pollution of an
interstate body of water by a private corporation residing within
that state. Hopefully, continued use and development of the federal
common law of nuisance will provide more effective protection for
our valuable interstate bodies of water, as well as lead to further
and better legislation by highlighting the gaps in presently existing
legislation. It is submitted, however, that the court should not have
allowed the United States to file an action under the federal common
law of nuisance. Absent an express contention that the interests of
the United States are not adequately protected, such an action
would allow the federal government to circumvent the specific pro-
cedures for federal pollution abatement action established by Con-
gress in both the FWPCA and the 1972 Amendments, and would
therefore be incompatible with the federal policy expressed in those
96 33 U.S.C. § 1251(6) (Supp. II 1972). See text at note 83 supra.
97 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3730 (1972).
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enactments that the federal government should defer to states for
primary pollution enforcement.
PHILIP E. MURRAY, JR.
Antitrust Law—Environmental Law—Use of Antitrust Law as En-
vironmental Remedy for Suppression of Pollution Control
Technology—in re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No.
31. 1 —Defendants, the automobile industry's "Big Four" and the
industry trade association, 2 participated in a joint research-and-
development effort aimed at solving the problem of automobile-
caused air pollution. 3 In 1953 the industry set up the Vehicle Com-
bustion Products Committee to facilitate joint research, and two
years later a cross-licensing agreement was added under which any
discoveries would be equally available to all participants. 4 After
industry critics charged that the joint effort was retarding, not
speeding, the anti-pollution effort, a federal grand jury was
convened. 5 The Justice Department subsequently filed a civil anti-
trust suit against defendants, 6 charging them with a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.? The complaint alleged that defend-
ants and other companies (named as co-conspirators but not as
defendants) had conspired to eliminate competition among them-
selves in the research, development, manufacture, installation and
publicity of air pollution control devices and in the purchase of
patents and patent rights covering such equipments The suit was
settled by a consent decree under which the defendants, without
admitting any illegal practices, agreed to cease any anticompetitive
activity. 9 In approving the decree, the district court denied the
1 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1973 Trade Cas.) ¶ 74,819, at 95,647 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1973), on
remand from 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973).
2
 The defendants were General Motors Corp., Chrysler Corp., American Motors Corp.,
Ford Motor Co. and the Automobile Manufacturers' Association, Inc.
3 The concern over automobile emissions was intensified in 1950, when Dr. Arlie
Haagen-Smit, a California biochemist, discovered the link between automobile exhaust gases
and smog. Esposito, Vanishing Air 36 (1970) (the Nader task-force report on air pollution).
4 Nader, Unsafe at Any Speed 154 (1965). See generally Green, The Closed Enterprise
System 254-63 (1972) (the Nader task-force report on antitrust enforcement); L. Jaffe & L.
Tribe, Environmental Protection 141-80 (1971).
5 Green, supra note 4, at 25.5.
6 For a description of the complaint, see United States v. Automobile Mfrs, Ass'n,
[1961-1970 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg, Rep. ¶ 45,069, at 52,705 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Complaint].
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The section reads, in pertinent part: "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . ."
See Complaint, supra note 6, at 52,705.
9 United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, .307 F. Supp, 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd
mem. sub nom. New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970). The text of the decree is
reported in 1969 Trade Cas, 72,907, at 87,456. In substance it prohibited the defendants
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